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This paper uses jc alictia-  data to test the existe  of r— 
xITI,etitive, ex—ante rents in the labor market.  We first examine whether 
jds that pay the legal mininurn wage faos an eessive ly  of labor as 
maasured by the xu±er of jth a,licatict rivei for the nrst racent 
pcsiticz filled by the firs.  The results irdicate that cçeriiixjs  for jc 
that pay the mininum wage attract significantly amre j  alicaticz than  j  that pay either amre or less than the mininian wage.  This spike in the 
jth aplicatic* rate distrihxtiai irdicates that ex-ante rents generated for 
iloy  by an above market—level miniiTtni  th !xt at.cear to be 
(x2)letely dissipated  by Tpl'er acticns. 
The sex1 part of the paper uses a similar arproadi to examine whether 
jths in high—wage inustries pay  above market-clearix wage rates.  We fin a 
weak, positive relaticrship between inter-iedustxy  alicatios differentials 
aed inter—lixiustry  wage differentials.  In acbiiticn, r  results iiicate 
that iployer size has a sizeable positive efft c  the jdi alicatia rate 
even after tro11is  for the wage rate.  The paper orriders several 
possible qlanati for these findings. 
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East I.arisirg,  MI  48824  Cantricbe,  02138  Priitcr University  Priitai,  MI 08544 In a  labor market where workers seek rents, employers that offer a 
supra—competitive wage would face a long queue of qualified workers, 
The presence of this job queue would encourage employers to reduce their 
wage to the market-clearing level.  Interference in the wage setting 
process from government regulation (e.g.  an enforced minimum wage law) 
or from union bargaining power could prevent the forces of labor market 
competition from lowering wages to eliminate excessive job queues.  In 
addition, efficiency wage, expense—preference, and insider—outsider 
models suggest that some firms or managers may find it in their 
interests to maintain above market—clearing wages.1  In this paper  we 
test for the presence of above market—clearing total compensation 
packages by examining whether firms that pay the minimum wage or that 
are in high—wage industries face an excessive supply of labor as 
measured by their number of job applicants.2 
A government—enforced minimum wage law provides a natural 
experiment to examine the relationship between wage premia and job 
'The efficiency wage literature is surveyed by Stiglitz  (1986) and 
Katz (1986).  Insider-outsider models are surveyed by Lindbeck and 
Snower (1986).  Jensen and Meckling  (1976)  discuss managerial agency 
models. 
2The approach of examining relative application rates to determine 
whether earnings differentials among jobs are non—market clearing has a 
venerable tradition in labor economics.  In their classic study of the 
relative wages of doctors and dentists, Friedman and Kuznets  (1945)  rely 
heavily on a comparative analysis of application rates to medical and 
dental schools.  Given that the preliminary training required for the 
two professions is virtually identical, Friedman and Kuznets  (p. 124) 
conclude that their finding that "more than four times as many persons 
applied annually for admission to American medical schools as for 
admission to American dental schools" is sufficient alone to establish 
that "at existing levels of remuneration, prospective practitioners 
consider medicine more attractive than dentistry.'  And H.G. Lewis 
(1963)  uses a similar approach to examine the importance of entry 
barriers  into the medical profession as well as the relative earnings of 
doctors and dentists. queues.  Unless firms find it profitable to extract all rents from 
workers that are generated by a binding minimum wage by cutting fringe 
benefits, raising effort requirements, upgrading hiring standards, or 
letting working conditions deteriorate, positions in which firms are 
constrained to increase wages to meet the legal minimum wage will confer 
rents to workers.  A  finding that jobs that offer the minimum wage  tend 
to face an excessive queue of job applicants would support the joint 
hypothesis that firms do not extract all rents generated by the minimum 
wage, and that there is a labor supply response to the presence of these 
rents. 
Our second application pertains to the inter-industry wage 
structure.  Much  research has documented the existence of large and 
persistent inter-industry wage differentials for similar workers.3  In a 
textbook competitive labor market model, persistent wage differentials 
for observationa].ly  equivalent workers must reflect either compensating 
differentials for nonwage job attributes or unmeasured differences in 
worker productive abilities.  Under this market—clearing scenario, one 
does not necessarily expect any systematic relationship between wages 
and the job application rate.4 
On the other hand, labor market segmentation models (e.g. 
efficiency wage, rent sharing and insider—outsider models) provide an 
alternative explanation for inter—industry wage differentials  in which 
3For recent evidence see Dickens and Katz (l987a,b) and Krueger and 
Summers  (1987,  1988) 
4unqualified workers may apply for high wage jobs and give  the 
misleading appearance of a job queue even in a market—clearing 
situation.  We return to this issue below, 3 
workers in high—wage  industries earn rents relative to their opportunity 
cost.  Thus, these models predict that firms in high-wage industries 
should attract longer queues of job applicants than firms in low—wage 
industries.  Demonstrations of a comparatively lower quit rate in high— 
wage industries by Pencavel (1970)  and others provide some evidence of 
the presence of rents in high—wage industries, although this 
relationship may also be attributable to specific human capital and 
omitted worker quality variables.  While quit rate differentials provide 
evidence on the location of ex—oost rents, the relationship between the 
number of job applicants per opening and wage  differentials provides a 
more direct test of the presence of ex—ante rents in high—wage jobs. 
The prediction of segmented labor market models of the presence of 
equilibrium ex—ante rents in some jobs has been severely criticized on 
theoretical grounds.  The basic idea behind this critique is that if 
there are queues for jobs because they pay ex—ante rents, workers will 
be willing to pay to obtain these jobs (Carmichael, 1985).  Murphy and 
Topel  (1987)  argue that even if explicit job purchases are ruled out, 
firms may have alternative mechanisms to extract the ex—ante rents that 
arise from wage premia paid for efficiency wage reasons.5  These 
arguments essentially deny the possibility of rents in almost any 
situation.  In particular, this line of reasoning has been applied to 
the case of a government—imposed minimum wage.  Wessels  (1980a,b), 
Mincer  (1984)  and others contend that firms constrained to pay the legal 
minimum wage have an incentive to reduce fringe benefits and erode 
5The fairness efficiency wage model  (Akerlof and Yellen, 1987) and 
models based on the bargaining power of insiders are less susceptible to 
this bonding critique. working conditions until all rents are completely dissipated.  On the 
other hand, firms may choose not to extract all surplus from workers 
because such actions may reduce morale and productivity, or because 
employers may be utilitarian and the cost to workers of changing nonwage 
compensation may greatly outweigh the reduction in costs to employers. 
In the next section, we discuss the factors likely to determine 
whether firms constrained to pay the minimum wage will fully dissipate 
rents, and discuss theoretical issues concerning the relationship 
between job application rates and wages.  We then examine whether firms 
that are constrained to pay the minimum wage attract excessive queues of 
job seekers as measured by the number of job applications they receive 
per opening.  The micro—level employer—reported data on job applicants, 
firm characteristics, and wages that we utilize is described in section 
two.  Our empirical results concerning the minimum wage are presented in 
section three.  The main finding is that firms that pay the minimum wage 
receive substantially more  applicants for their job openings than firms 
that pay either more or less than the minimum wage.  This finding makes 
plausible the idea that above market—clearing wage premiums can persist 
in the labor market. 
In section 4 we examine whether jobs in high—wage industries 
attract more applicants than similar jobs in low-wage industries. 
Although the evidence on the relationship between job queues and 
inter—industry wage differentials is somewhat inconclusive, the results 
suggest that firms in high—wage industries attract a larger number of 
job applicants than other firms.  In addition, the empirical work  shows 
that the size of an establishment has a large, positive effect on then 5 
number of applicants for a given job opening that cannot be explained by 
the higher starting wages paid by larger establishments. 
1.  Theoretical Considerations 
A.  Minimum Wages. Job Queues, and Rent DissiDation 
In the standard textbook analysis of an above market—level minimum 
wage,  employers constrained to pay the minimum wage are assumed to not 
offset the minimum wage by reducing other forms of compensation 
(Stigler, 1946).  Workers remaining in minimum wage jobs are made 
better—off since their total compensation rises by the mandated increase 
in wages.  The minimum wage reduces the number of jobs in the covered 
sector by increasing the relative cost of labor and creates rents for 
workers employed in minimum wage jobs.  The model yields ambiguous 
predictions concerning the impact of the minimum wage on the welfare of 
workers in the uncovered sector and the workers displaced from the 
covered sector (Mincer, 1976).  However, the standard model 
unambiguously predicts that jobs that are constrained to pay the minimum 
wage should attract a relatively large queue of job applicants. 
Wessels (l980a,b), Hashimoto (1981),  and Mincer (1984) have 
analyzed an extended model of the minimum wage in Which firms attempt to 
offset mandated wage increases by altering other unregulated aspects of 
the compensation package.  Firms can lower labor costs by reducing 
expenditures on fringe benefits, reducing on—the—job training, and 
worsening working conditions,  Firms will continue to attract employees 
until total compensation is lowered to a market—clearing level.  The 
presence of the minimum wage leads covered firms to provide an 6 
inefficient compensation package,  This reduces labor demand at the 
total compensation level prevailing before the minimum wage was imposed. 
If the labor supply schedule to the low-wage sector of the labor market 
is upward sloping, a minimum wage can actually reduce the total 
compensation in both covered and uncovered jobs.6 
Thus, if firms can completely dissipate the rents generated by a 
minimum wage law, all workers —— including those holding minimum wage 
jobs —— can  be made worse—off by the minimum wage, and in this situation 
minimum wage jobs would not face excessive queues of job applicants. 
If,  on the other hand, firms do not fully dissipate rents then the 
welfare of those obtaining minimum wage jobs is improved, and jobs that 
offer the minimum wage  should receive a relatively large number of job 
applicants. 
Wessels  (l980b)  suggests three reasons why firms may not choose to, 
or may not be able to, fully offset the increase in workers' total 
compensation generated by the imposition of a minimum wage.  First, the 
fixed costs of adjusting the compensation package may outweigh the 
potential cost savings.  This is likely to be the case if the minimum 
wage is set in nominal terms and is expected to be rapidly eroded away 
by inflation.  Second, the amount of adjustments possible on unregulated 
aspects of compensation may not be large enough to offset the minimum 
wage  (e.g.  fringe benefits are only a small part of the compensation 
package in low-wage jobs).  Third, nonwage conditions of work  (e.g. 
6We note that as a practical matter it is unlikely that those who 
hold minimum wage jobs are made much worse-off as a result of the 
minimum wage because available econometric evidence surveyed in Brown, 
Gilroy and Kohen (1983) suggests that the relevant demand schedule is 
very inelastic. 7 
heating and work pace) may be public goods affecting workers above the 
minimum wage  as well as minimum wage workers, or legal requirements such 
as pension regulations and equal rights laws may require that all 
workers are treated equally and thus essentially turn some private goods 
into public goods. 
There are two further reasons why firms  may not reduce nonwage 
expenditures to fully eliminate the increased rents for covered 
employees created by a binding minimum wage.  The first is related to 
efficiency wage models of the labor market and depends on the additional 
assumption of decreasing marginal utility of wages and fringe benefits.7 
According to efficiency wage models, worker productivity is a  positive 
function of compensation.  This relationship is posited because higher 
compensation may reduce turnover and absenteeism, increase effort, or 
make it easier to recruit workers.  To see that a firm will not totally 
offset the wage increase brought about by a minimum wage if productivity 
depends on worker pay, suppose that an "efficiency wage" employer were 
to fully offset the minimum wage by cutting fringe benefits to the point 
where the worker's compensation equals the pre—minimum wage level.  In 
this situation, the compensation mix is not optimal and a dollar spent 
on fringe benefits has more than a dollar's value to employees.  If the 
firm increases fringe benefits above this level, the increase in net 
worker productivity will more than pay for the additional cost of fringe 
benefits.  When faced with a positive wage—productivity schedule, a firm 
is no longer a wage—taker —— the  firm's effective labor supply is an 
71n a similar vein, Wessels  (l980b)  notes that turnover costs may  induce firms to only partially offset a minimum wage increase. 8 
upward sloping function of  its wage and fringe benefits, and this will 
inhibit the firm's desire to fully offset the minimum wage.  A  similar 
argument could be made if the firm has monopsony power over its workers. 
The final reason why firms might not fully offset a minimum wage 
increase is related to agency problems which give firms non—profit 
maximizing preferences.  According to this argument, because managers 
are not perfectly monitored by shareholders, firms will maximize 
objective functions that depend positively on their employees' utility 
as well as profits.  In this situation, a firm will not totally offset a 
wage  increase generated by the minimum wage because to do so may exact a 
great toll from workers while only raising profits by a small amount for 
the firm.  To take an extreme example, if after eliminating fringe 
benefits workers who earn the minimum wage still receive some surplus, 
it seems unlikely that managers will require workers to perform arduous 
tasks if such activities only generate a trivial amount of additional 
profit for the firm. 
There is limited evidence that firms adjust some nonwage aspects of 
their compensation package in response to binding increases in the 
minimum wage. Wessels (1980a,b) reports the results of a survey of 
offsets made  by retail stores in response to the New York state minimum 
wage law of 1957.  Only a small minority of the stores reported 
reductions in fringe  benefits although many reduced the hours of work  of 
minimum wage workers.  Alpert (1986)  finds no evidence of more than 
quite minor reductions in fringe  benefits in response to large increases 
in the minimum wage in the restaurant industry in the 1970's.  Lastly, 
Leighton and Mincer  (1981)  provide some evidence of reduced job training 9 
and lower wage growth in response to increased minimum wages for workers 
with less than high school education. 
The number of job applicants for minimum wage jobs relative to the 
number of applicants for other jobs provides a direct test of the 
standard model of the minimum wage which assumes incomplete nonwage 
offsets versus the full offset model.  The failure of firms to 
completely of  f  set the compensation increase created by a minimum wage 
clearly leads to the prediction of greater numbers of applicants to 
firms paying the minimum wage  than to uncovered or noncomplying firms 
paying wages below the minimum wage. 
Additionally, a spike in applications at minimum wage jobs relative 
to  jobs that pay more than the minimum wage and jobs that pay less 
than the minimum wage would provide even stronger evidence that rents 
created by the minimum wage are not totally dissipated.  First, jobs 
paying more than the minimum wage may have different entry requirements 
than jobs paying the minimum wage or less.  The job application rate may 
vary with skill levels.  A finding of a discontinuous jump in 
applications at the minimum wage will suggest that the minimum  wage is 
not just picking up the general application-wage profile.  Second, and 
perhaps more important, jobs that pay more than the minimum wage may be 
equally desirable as jobs that pay the minimum wage or less, but may 
offer a higher wage to compensate workers for some disamenable working 
condition.  In this equalizing differences eguilibrium, a binding 
minimum wage will increase the desirability of minimum wage jobs 
relative to jobs that pay more than the minimum wage, and thus generate 
a spike in applications at the minimum wage.  This latter argument is 10 
more plausible for jobs that are only slightly above the minimum wage. 
B,  Job Application Rates and Wages with Homogeneous Workers 
We first consider a labor  market with identical workers and with 
firms that differ in their valuations of the benefits of filling a 
vacant job.8  Finns attract applicants by announcing the existence of 
the job opening and advertising its offered wage.  Job seekers 
costlessly obtain all relevant infonnation about job openings.  Each job 
seeker is assumed to be able to apply to only a single f  irs.  If the job 
seeker is the only applicant for the opening, he or she is hired and 
paid the advertised wage.  If more than one person applies for the job, 
the f  irs randomly selects from the applicant pool.  If a worker is 
unlucky and not selected for a job he is assumed to consume leisure 
and/or work in home production, which provides a lower level of utility 
than the forgone job. 
The net expected benefit of applying to any job opening must be 
equalized across openings in equilibrium.  Job seekers will then be 
indifferent between applying for low wage positions Which have  a high 
probability of acceptance, and applying for high wage positions which 
have a low probability of acceptance.  Workers pick higher probabilities 
of applying to high wage jobs in equilibrium,9  Finns choose wages 
section draws heavily from Montgomery's  (1987)  formal model 
of the relationship between wages and job queues.  See Lang  (1987)  and 
Weitzman  (1987) for related models. 
9Montgoruery  assumes each job seeker can apply to only one job.  The 
basic equilibrium condition that the expected value of applying to a 
opening is constant across openings even when applicants can make 
multiple applications as long as workers are not able to apply to all 
openings.  If workers cannot apply to all openings, high wage jobs will 
receive more applicants than low wage jobs.  Lang (1987)  analyzes in 
detail the issues that arise when workers can simultaneously apply to 11 
knowing that job seekers respond in this manner.  Thus, firms with high 
valuations of filling a job will offer high wages in order to attract a 
larger expected number of applicants.  A  direct result of the 
equilibrium condition in this model is that the expected number of 
applicants for an opening will be positively related to the offered 
wage. 
C.  Heteroaeneous  Labor with Nonrandom Selection 
If individuals differ in their productive capacities, and if 
employers make job offers to applicants on the basis of their 
perceptions of workers' abilities, the analysis becomes more 
complicated.  Our purpose here is only to present a heuristic discussion 
of these effects. 
It is probably reasonable to assume that individuals have a noisy 
estimate of their ability relative to the labor force, and that 
prospective employers have an imperfect but positively correlated 
measure of each applicant's ability.  A final assumption is that there 
is a positive correlation between the applicant's reservations wage and 
ability. 
An increase in total compensation in this situation potentially 
has three distinct effects on the application rate.  First, a job 
candidate's expectation of being rated the most highly qualified 
applicant and therefore of being selected for the job is diminished. 
This occurs because individuals with higher reservation wages and 
therefore greater expected ability will apply for the job (Weiss, 1980; 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1982).  The average quality of the job queue 
more than one firm and receive more than one offer. 12 
increases.  In the extreme case, if employees know with certainty who 
the most qualified applicant for the job will be, only that individual 
will apply for the job. 
The second effect occurs because an increase in a job's wage, 
holding all else constant, makes it a  more attractive alternative than 
other jobs and is therefore worth applying for even though the chance of 
ultimately being selected is reduced.  This is the result that is 
discussed in the model above in the case of homogeneous labor. 
Finally, some workers may find it in their best interest to apply 
for high—wage jobs for which they lack the required training and skills 
to perform the job adequately.  Since employers only have an inaccurate 
measure of job seekers' abilities, there is a nonzero probability that 
unqualified workers will succeed in being selected for high-wage jobs. 
As a result, high wages may attract relatively many unqualified 
applicants.  If this is quantitatively and important effect, it will be 
impossible to distinguish between the segmented labor market 
interpretation and the human capital interpretation of inter-industry 
wage differentials on the basis of inter-industry differences in 
application rates without further knowledge of the abilities of job 
applicants. 
2.  Data 
The data we use are from an evaluation survey of the Employment 
Opportunity Pilot Project  (EOPP)  sponsored by the National Institute of 
Education and the National Center for Research in Vocational Education. 
Although the survey is longitudinal, we focus on the 1982 follow-up 13 
cross—section because it contains specific information on the 
demographic characteristics and starting salary of the selected job 
applicant, as well as information on the vacant position.  A  total of 
3,400 firms were surveyed.  The surveyed firms are located in 28 
geographic sites, with a disproportionate number of  sites concentrated 
in southern and midwestern states.  Twelve of the sites are SNSA's. 
Employers were contacted by phone between February and June of 1982, and 
the person who "handles the hiring activity" for the company for the 
area contained within the geographic site was asked to directly answer 
the questionnaire.  The survey deliberately over—sampled low—wage firms. 
The survey contains information on the recent hiring activities of 
firms,  specifically, the person responsible for hiring was asked 
several questions concerning the last position filled by a "new 
employee" prior to August 1981,  including the number of applicants for 
the position, the Occupational category of the position, the starting 
salary, and the new worker's demographic characteristics (age,  sex, 
training, work experience and education))'0  The designers of the survey 
intended that the question concerning the number of persons who applied 
for the last position filled should measure the number of individuals 
formally applying for the position.11  A formal application typically 
would require a  worker to submit a written application form; casual 
1'0Three—quarters  of the  firms  in the survey hired their most  recent 
employee in 1981;  15% hired their most  recent employee in 1980;  7% hired  their most recent employee in 1979;  and 3% hired their most recent 
employee in 1978.  The survey also contains a small number of firms 
whose most recent outside hire was prior to 1978, but these observations 
are dropped from the sample because the accuracy of the retrospective 
information is likely to become less accurate with time. 
11Persona].  communication from John Bishop of Cornell University. 14 
inquiries over the phone or personal visits that do not involve a 
written application were not intended to be counted as job 
applications.12  In situations where multiple employees are hired for 
the last position filled, we divide the number of applicants by the 
number of workers hired. 
In addition to questions on recruitment and employee 
characteristics, the survey contains information on several aspects of 
the employer, including firm and establishment size, industry, 
proportion of workers covered by a union contract, and geographic 
location.  Unfortunately, the establishment size variables is defined in 
a nonstandard way.  Instead of asking for the size of an individual 
establishment, the establishment size question solicits the combined 
size (number of employees) of all the establishments of a particular 
firm that are located within the geographic site,  As a result, 
establishment size in this data set is a conglomeration of typically 
defined establishment size and firm size measures. 
Aeplication Rates and Unemoloyment 
In order to crudely gauge the  validity of the application variable 
as a  measure of labor market conditions, we regress the average 
application rate in a city on the local unemployment rate for a sample 
of 28 cities,  Results of estimating this regression (with standard 
errors in parentheses) are presented below. 
12Thjs interpretation of the application measure seems especially 
plausible since earlier in the survey respondents were asked questions 
that treated phone inquiries from people seeking work, visits to the 
company of individuals seeking work, written job applications, and 
formal job interviews as distinct categories. 15 
(1)  in (Applications per  =  3.954 + .710  ln(UR)  R2=.15 
Last opening)  (.850)  (.329) 
The relationship between the site level job application rate and 
the unemployment rate is positive and statistically significant.'3 
While we do not put a structural interpretation on this equation, it 
suggests that the application rate is correlated with the 
characteristics of the local labor market.  As the fraction of the labor 
force that is unemployed increases, more applications are received by 
firms in the area.  Later we compare this estimate of the responsiveness 
of the application rate with respect to a change in the unemployment 
rate to the responsiveness of the application rate with respect to a 
change in the wage rate. 
3.  Emtirical Evidence on Queues for Minimum Wage Jobs 
A  legally enforced and binding minimum wage provides a clear 
opportunity to examine the relationship between job applications and 
wage premia.  Under a wide variety of assumptions, economic models 
predict that imposing an above market-level minimum wage will result in 
an excess supply of labor to those firms.  Unless firms can extract all 
rents by cutting fringe benefits or making work more burdensome, firms 
that are constrained by the minimum wage should receive more job 
applications than firms that are in labor markets where the minimum wage 
:L)since other characteristics of firms and the labor force might 
affect the relationship between applications and unemployment, we also 
estimate equations that include average firm size and a dummy variable 
for being in an SMSA.  The results are not significantly changed by 
including these variables. 16 
is not constraining.  The existence of a queue for minimum wage jobs 
would support a conclusion that employers do  fully offset the 
effects of a minimum wage by altering some other form of compensation or 
working conditions. 
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations for several 
variables disaggregated by whether the starting wage for the job was 
less than, equal to,  or greater than the legal minimum wage that was in 
effect in the year the position was filled)4  Fortunately, the survey 
provides a disproportionally large sample of low—wage jobs —— 197 (14%) 
job openings in the sample paid newly hired workers the prevailing legal 
minimum wage, and 65  (5%)  job openings paid a  starting wage below the 
prevailing legal  minimum wage.  Jobs that pay less than the minimum wage 
are either not covered by the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act  (FLSA)  or are in violation of the Act,  Congress raised 
the minimum wage six times in the 1970's.  The  1977 amendments to the 
FLSA scheduled increases in the minimum wage for each year from 1978 to 
1981,15  As a result, in years covered by our sample (1978-1981), 
increases in the minimum wage were expected and scheduled in advance, 
which should have facilitated any possible nonwage offsets by employers. 
Looking at Table 1, workers who are hired into minimum wage jobs 
are on average less educated, younger, less experienced and more likely 
14We have eliminated from the sample 40 restaurant jobs that offer 
a subminimum wage because workers in these jobs are likely to receive 
unreported tips, and as a consequence the hourly wage will not 
adequately reflect the total compensation of these workers. 
15The minimum wage rate was $2.65 in 1978, $2.90 in 1979, $3.10 in 
1980 and $3.35 in 1981.  Increases in the minimum wage over this time 
period roughly kept pace with inflation. Table 1 
Maans  (Staraxd rviati) by Startirg W*irly Wage Rate 
Less 
. 
than  Subsa1e 
Miithum  )re than 
Variable  Mininun We  Waqe  Mthinnn 1e 
1o  Applications  1.34  1.59  1.42 
Per 0penir  (1.15)  (1.19)  (1.18) 
licatia  8.76  11.40  9.62 
Per Cpenin  (19.96)  (25.77)  (21.67) 
Male  .38  .43  .59 
(.49)  (.50)  (.49) 
24.70  24.06  27.64 
(10.82)  (8.54)  (8.98> 
High Sdo1  .66  .72  .77 
Graduate  (.48)  (.45)  (.42) 
Collee  .06  .05  .15 
Graduate  (.24)  (.21)  (.36) 
Years of Relevant  .62  .85  2.82 
Experiere  (1.70)  (1.75)  (4.83) 
Hairs of On The  43.22  39.20  58.31 
Jcb Trainir  (62.57)  (81.40)  (93.69) 
Weekly Hairs  .31  .53  .78 
>  35  (.47)  (.50)  (.41> 
Weekly Hairs  .45  .32  .12 
Betw.  20 aril 35  (.50)  (.47)  (.32) 
Tiporary Jth  .15  .13  .09 
(.36)  (.34)  (.29) 
Seasaal Jcb  .11  .06  .05 
(.31)  (.23>  (.21> 
Estab1isnt  24.15  44.73  68.86 
Size  (66.10)  (85.29)  (228.12) 
White Onilar  .55  .41  .52 
(.50)  (.49)  (.50) 
tys Betwaen  7.75  12.18  17.95 
8eginnir of Searth  (8.26)  (21.69)  (33.02)  ar Start of Work 
Sazçle size  65  197  1,102 
Note:  Sasple iixthes all workers who  earn nre than $1.00 per Iir.  The sex, 
age,  anS ucation qj.esti pertain to the worker who was hired for the jcb. 17 
to be female than workers who are hired into jobs that pay more than the 
minimum wage; while workers whose starting  wage is less  than the minimum 
wage have similar personal characteristics  and training to workers whose 
starting wage equals  the minimum wage.  In addition, as others have 
found using different data sets,  this sample shows that jobs that pay 
either  the minimum wage or a subniinimum wage are more likely  to offer 
part-time  work compared to jobs that pay more than the minimum wage. 
These summary statistics suggest that workers whose starting wage is 
less than the minimum wage may be fairly  close substitutes  for workers 
whose starting wage exactly equals  the minimum wage, but workers who 
earn more than the minimum wage have different skills and qualifications 
than workers who earn the minimum wage or less. 
Most importantly for our purposes,  the table indicates that the 
number of applicants per job opening is greater for positions that pay 
exactly the minimum wage to start than for positions that initially  pay 
either more or less than the legal  minimum wage.  The pairwise 
comparisons  of the difference in the mean log application rate between 
the subsample of workers whose starting  wage rate equals the minimum 
wage and each of the other two groups are both statistically significant 
at the 10%  level.  These differences in application rates are not driven 
largely by a few outliers.  The median  number of applicants per job 
opening for jobs that paid exactly the minimum wage was 5 as compared to 
4 both for jobs that paid less than the minimum wage and for jobs that 
paid more than the minimum wage. 
In addition, we find that an apparent "spike" in application  rates 
at the minimum wage exists when we limit  our sample to the narrow band 18 
of jobs that pay within 25 cents of the minimum wage.  On average, 10.02 
applicants applied per job opening that paid within 25 cents less than 
the minimum wage; 11.40 applicants applied per job opening that paid 
exactly the minimum wage; and 10.92  applicants applied per job opening 
that paid within 25 cents more than the minimum wage)6 These findings 
suggest that there is a discrete jump in applications at the minimum 
wage. 
If a job offers an above market-clearing  wage and therefore 
attracts a queue of qualified applicants,  the duration of time required 
to fill a vacancy for this job will be short relative to other jobs that 
do not offer an above  market—clearing wage rate.  It follows that a 
complementary test of the existence of rents in minimum wage jobs would 
be that vacancies in jobs that offer the minimum wage will require less 
time to fill than vacancies in other jobs,  all else equal. 
Unfortunately, the EOPP survey only allows us to address this issue 
indirectly.  The survey asks a question on the length  of time elapsed 
"between [when  the employer) started looking for someone to fill the 
opening and the time the new employee started work."  However, one 
serious shortcoming of this question is that the length of time between 
when a new employee is hired and he or she actually begins work may 
increase  with the skill requirements of the position  (i.e. the academic 
job market ends in February or March but new assistant professors do not 
officially  begin work until September).  As a result, this question may 
16The findings are similar when the sample includes all jobs that 
pay within 50 cents of the minimum wage.  On average, 10.25 applicants 
applied per job opening that paid within 50 cents less than the minimum 
wage and 9.47 applicants  applied per job opening that paid within 50 
cents  more than the minimum wage. 19 
not adequately represent the duration of employer search  time necessary 
to recruit a new employee for a vacancy. 
In the EOPP sample  the average time elapsed between the initiation 
of a job search and the actual  date an employee begins  work is shorter 
among jobs that pay the minimum wage than among jobs that pay more than 
the minimum wage, but is shorter still in jobs where the starting wage 
is less than the minimum wage (see Table 1).  This pattern suggests that 
responses  to this particular vacancy duration question may reflect the 
lag between the date a job offer is accepted and the date the new 
employee eventually assumes his job instead of the comparative 
difficulty of filling a job vacancy. 
In Table 2 we estimate OLS regressions  to examine whether the 
"spike in applications for minimuii wage jobs holds-up after controlling 
for a variety of alternative sets of independent  variables.  The 
dependent variable in the regressions  is the natural log of the number 
of applicants for the last position filled  by an outside hire.  We 
include a dummy variable that equals one if the job pays the minimum 
wage and zero otherwise,  and another dummy variable that equals one if 
the job pays a subminimum  wage and zero otherwise,  The reported 
coefficients should be interpreted  as the proportionate excess supply of 
job applicants  relative to firms that pay more than the minimum wage. 
Because workers who earn substantially  more than the minimum wage may 
very well be in different labor markets than workers who earn the 
minimum wage or less, we eliminate from the sample workers whose wage 
rate exceeds $5.00 an hour.  However, we note that our results are 
qualitatively  unchanged when we examine the full sample, and we report Table 2 
plicaticzi  Differentials  for Minirr.mi Wage ard Sulxiinintnn  Wage 
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estimates  of the same equations  using the full sample in Appendix Table 
Al)7 
The regressions  show a statistically  significant,  sizeable and 
positive differential  in the application  rate between jobs that pay the 
minimum  wage and jobs that pay more than the minimum wage, while jobs 
that are above  or below the minimum  wage do not have a statistically 
significant  difference in applications.  According to the point 
estimates,  jobs offering the minimum  wage attract between 22.5%  and 26% 
more applications  than jobs that offer  a starting wage that exceeds the 
minimum  wage, and between 20% and 10% more applications than jobs that 
pay starting wages that are less than  the minimum  wage.  The application 
differentials  fall when employer size  variables are added to the 
regression,  but are not very much influenced  by the other independent 
variables  such as industry  affiliation  or union coverage.  Employer size 
has an important  effect  on these  results because workers who earn a 
subminimum  wage tend to work in relatively  small establishments,  and 
results  discussed more fully  below show  that the application  rate is 
lower in small firms,  all else equal. 
These results take on added significance  since it is unlikely that 
workers  who apply for jobs for which  they are unqualified in the hope of 
deceiving their  employer will apply  for minimum wage jobs.  Such 
beguiling  behavior will have a higher  payoff in jobs that pay more than 
the minimum  wage.  Moreover,  the finding  that more workers apply for 
17We also note that the spike in the application  rate for minimum 
wage jobs  becomes larger  and more statistically  significant  when we 
narrow the sample to the group of workers who are age twenty—one or 
younger. 21 
minimum wage jobs than for jobs paying a greater wage than the minimum 
wage suggests that the excess  supply of applicants  for minimum wage jobs 
relative to jobs  below the minimum wage does not merely reflect an 
upward sloping applicant—wage  relationship. 
This spike in applications  for firms  paying the minimum wage 
strongly suggests  that workers queue for minimum wage jobs,  which in 
turn implies that employers do not fully  offset  the effects of the 
minimum wage by reducing fringe  benefits or eroding working conditions. 
Since employers  constrained  to pay the minimum  wage may be able to cut 
back on direct recruiting  activities (e.g. advertising  job openings)  and 
still attract applicants,  our estimate of the minimum wage application 
differential  may even understate  the effect  of the rents  generated by 
the minimum wage on application  rates. 
4.  The Inter-Industry  Wage Structure  and Job Aoplications 
This section examines the relationship  between two—digit industry 
affiliation  and application  rates.  It is well known that industry 
status exerts  a powerful influence  on workers' wages,  and that the 
industry  wage structure is extremely stable  over time,  However, the 
interpretation  of these facts  is not clear.  If inter—industry  wage 
differentials  are equalizing  differentials for nonwage aspects of work, 
then we would not expect to find a systematic  relationship  between 
application  rates and wages at the industry  level.  On the other hand, 
if differences  in wages across  industries  are rents  to workers there 
should be a positive relationship  between inter-industry  application 
rates and wages. 22 
To test whether jobs in high—wage  industries  offer wages above 
market—clearing  rates,  we assume  that  when occupation,  education, 
geographic  location,  and other  variables are held constant,  a firm's 
industry  does not directly influence  the number  of applications the firm 
receives  for its available  job openings;  instead, industry  operates 
indirectly  on applications  through its effect on wages.  Under this 
exclusion  restriction, a test of the market—clearing  hypothesis boils 
down to whether using industry  dummy  variables as instnments  for the 
wage rate in an application  equation  gives a positive estimate of the 
wage-application  relationship.  Moreover,  the industry  exclusion 
restriction  ia testable  because there are many industry dummies to 
estimate only one parameter. 
To fix ideas,  consider  the following  structural  model of the log 
of job applications per opening,  A, and the log of the starting wage 
rate,  W: 
(2)  AWSW+Xax+LA 
(3)  W=APA+ZflE+X$x+cW 
where  is the elasticity  of job applicants  with respect  to the wage 
rate,  Z is an  N x K  matrix of K  mutually exclusive industry  dummy 
variables, W  is a  K x 1  vector of industry  wage differentials,  and X 
is an  N  x q  matrix of control  variables that includes  a constant.18 
The c, ic{A,W},  are  N x 1  vectors of i.i.d.  errors.  There are N 
observations.  We assume  that 8 is a valid instrument  for W, so  that 
plim Z'W s 0  and plim Z'LA 
= 0.  Equation (2)  is over-identified 
18There are a total of K  + 1 mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
industry dummies,  but because the equations include constant  tens, only 
K industry dummies are included  in 8. 23 
because there are more than one industry  dummy that may be used as 
instruments  for W. 
A simultaneous  system is posited because in a standard  demand and 
supply framework  the wage rate offered affects the number  of applicants 
received, while the number of applicants simultaneously  affects the 
offered wage.  Even if the starting  wage is predetermined  and 
unresponsive to the number  of job applicants,  another reason for 
instrumenting  for the wage rate in the application  equation is that 
unobserved,  omitted variables in the application  equation  will affect 
the starting wage rate,  which  will lead to spurious correlation  between 
W and £A  For example, a university  bookstore  may attract more 
applicants  at any given  wage than a remote  bookstore and may therefore 
choose  a low wage policy.  A positive estimate of  is consistent  with 
the view that inter—industry  wage differentials represent  ex—ante rents 
to workers. 
Results 
Results of estimating  equation (2)  by two-stage least  squares are 
reported in Table 3.  The table  reports estimates  of three different 
specifications  using alternate  sets of included regressors (the X 
matrix).  Each specification  uses 34 industry  dummy variables as 
instruments  for the wage rate.  The results indicate  that the job 
application  rate tends to increase  with the starting wage rate,  however, 
this relationship becomes statistically  insignificant  once employer size 
and union coverage are held constant.  The point estimates  of the 
elasticity of applications  with respect to wages range from .27 to  .51. 
Comparing the latter  estimate of the application—wage  relationship  to Table 3 






1  2  3 
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Sales  .15  .150  .152  .240 
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the estimate of the application-unemployment  relationship reported 
earlier in equation (1), a 10% increase  in the starting wage rate has 
about  as much of an enhancing  effect  on the application  rate as a half 
of a percentage point increase  in the unemployment rate. 
The specification  tests reported in the bottom of Table 3  test the 
assumption  of the orthogonality  of the industry  dummies and the error 
term in the application  equation, and also summarize results of Hausman 
tests of simultaneity between the starting  wage and application  rate. 
The Generalized  Method of Moments (GMM)  error-orthogonality  test 
involves  regressing  the two—stage least  squares residuals on the 
industry  dummy  variables and included  regressors;  N  times the  from 
this regression asymptotically  follows  a chi-squared  distribution (see 
Newey, 1985).  A  weak relationship  between the residuals and instruments 
would indicate that the equation is properly specified.  The reported 
chi-squared  test of the null hypothesis  that industry is properly 
excluded from equation (2)  accepts at the .01 level and rejects at the 
.05 level for each of the specifications  in Table 3.  Given the large 
sample size,  however, the industry  exclusion  assumption may not be too 
bad an approximation.19 
In addition, the Hausman tests for endogeneity  of the wage in the 
application  equation (Which  are based on the assumption that industry 
dummy  variables are valid instruments  for the wage) are suggestive  of a 
simultaneous  relationship between applications  and starting wages.  We 
note,  however, that even though the probability  values for the Hausman 
19The exclusion restriction  would not be rejected using the 
Schwartz criterion ((K-i)  x ln(N)  = 233),  which allows the probability  of making a type I error to shrink  as the sample size grows. 25 
tests are greater than .10, there is a qualitative  difference in the 
estimated application-wage  elasticity  when equation (2)  is estimated by 
OLS and when it is estimated  by two—stage least squares using industry 
dummy variables to identify the wage.  For instance,  the OLS estimate  of 
the application—wage  elasticity  and standard error using the control 
variables in column (2)  is .03  (.11). 
To look  more deeply into  the relationship between the inter— 
industry wage structure  and applications,  Figure 1 presents a plot of 
industry application  differentials  against industry  wage differentials 
with the OLS line drawn through the points.20  Each set of differentials 
is obtained from a reduced form regression  of applications or wages on 
industry dummy variables  and the included  variables used in column (3) 
of Table 3  (i.e.  including  employer size,  union coverage, and other X— 
variables).21  Extreme points  are identified in the plot. 
The plot reveals  a linear relationship  between application 
differentials and wage differentials.  Some high—wage industries  such as 
public utilities and petroleum have extremely high application  rates, 
while low—wage industries  such as apparel have relatively low 
application rates.  While too much should not be made about individual 
points in the plot because of sampling error in estimating  the wage and 
application  differentials, it is interesting  that the mining industry 
20The OLS regression  through these  points can be shown to give a 
consistent estimate  of the elasticity  of applicants  with respect to 
wages.  This estimator,  which we denote  visual instrumental  variables, 
is an instrumental  variables  estimator although it differs from 2SLS. 
21The omitted industry  in each of these regressions  is given a 
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lies far below the fitted  line.  In spite of the high wages paid to 
miners, relatively few applicants  apply for each job opening in the 
mining industry.  This finding is consistent  with the obvious 
interpretation that a significant  element of the high average wage in 
the mining industry is a compensating differential for disagreeable 
work. 
Turning next to the other variables in the application  equation, 
it is interesting  to note that personal characteristics  such as age, 
education and sex have an insignificant  effect  on the application  rate. 
Jobs with more formal  and informal  on—the-job training,  however, tend to 
receive more applicants  than other jobs,  and there is substantial 
dispersion in job application  rates across  occupations. 
The size of an employer  has a tremendous effect  on the application 
rate.  The number of applications  per job opening rises sharply with 
establishment and firm size,  all else equal.22  In addition,  controlling 
for employer size greatly reduces the effect  of wages and union coverage 
on the application  rate.  Moreover, a GMM specification  test that adds 
employer size variables  to the list of excluded variables (Z)  fails, 
which suggests that employer size enters  directly into the application 
equation rather than indirectly  through its effect on wages. 
There are at least four plausible explanations for the significant 
establishment size—application  relationship  that exists  even after  wages 
22This finding is consistent  with results reported in Barron and 
Bishop (1985).  In addition,  Brown  and Medoff (1987)  find  that looking 
at only a sample of minimum wage jobs,  large employers report  more 
applicants  per job opening than small employers. 27 
are held constant.23  First, large firms are more visible and better 
known by job seekers compared to small employers.  As a result, there 
may be better information  about job openings at larger  firms.  Second, 
if there  are fixed  costs in applying  to firms it may be advantageous for 
job seekers to apply  to large firms  because the same application  may be 
used for  multiple openings.  Third,  our application  measure is a stock, 
not a flow,  and large firms  may maintain a greater inventory  of 
applications in their files  compared to small firms.  There is some 
indirect  evidence for this explanation  in the EOPP survey because we 
find that large  employers are more likely than small employers to report 
that they interviewed  applicants  who had previously  applied for 
positions in their firm.  Finally,  there may be nonwage aspects of work 
such as fringe  benefits  and favorable  working conditions that make large 
firms more attractive  employers  than small employers.  The last 
explanation, it should  be noted, runs counter  to explanations  of the 
positive employer-size  wage effect that are based on equalizing 
differences. 
5.  Conclusion 
Our empirical  examination  of application  rates for job openings 
that pay the minimum wage finds that  positions that offer the minimum 
23yurthermore,  this finding could  be,  at least  partially, an 
artifact related to the particular  application  measure utilized.  Large 
firms tend to make greater use of formal  application  procedures than 
small firms.  Casual inquiries  concerning  job openings are more likely 
to lead to the completion of a written application  form in large 
employers.  The greater use of written application  forms  by large firms 
may mean that casual  applications are more likely  to be picked up in our 
application  measure for large firms  than for small  firms. 28 
wage attract substantially  more applicants  than jobs that pay either 
more than the minimum wage or less than the minimum wage.  This spike in 
applications for minimum wage jobs supports the view that the minimum 
wage confers rents to low—wage  workers.  This result suggests that 
worker who obtain minimum wage jobs are made better—off  than they 
otherwise  would have been in the absence of a minimum wage law.  In 
addition, if true this finding casts  doubt on models of the minimum wage 
which predict that employers  will fully  offset the effects of a minimum 
wage by reducing fringe  benefits, on-the-job  training and eroding 
working conditions.  Since  employers  do not appear to extract all rents 
created by the minimum wage,  there is reason to believe that employers 
might not extract rents in other  contexts in the labor market. 
In the second half of the paper we examine the relationship 
between inter—industry  wage differentials  and application  rates.  There 
appears to be a weak, positive relationship  between inter—industry  job 
application differentials  and inter—industry  wage differentials.  This 
finding complements  the work of Pencavel (1970) and others  who document 
a negative effect of industry  wage differentials on turnover.  The 
apparent low quit rate and relatively  long queue of job applicants in 
high—wage industries  suggests  that differences in earnings  across 
industries  do not entirely reflect equilibrium  compensating 
differentials for nonwage work attributes.  However, it is not clear 
from these results whether the effects of industry  wage premia  on 
turnover and application  rates stem from unobserved  worker abilities  or 
from a labor supply  response to ex—ante rents. 
There are three reasons to believe that the observed positive 29 
relationship  between wages and job applications  at the industry level 
represents  a queuing response by workers to ex—ante rents and not a 
hoard of unqualified  workers attempting  to obtain high—skilled  jobs. 
First, the results of the analysis  of queues for minimum wage jobs 
suggests that the application  rate successfully  measure job queues in a 
situation  where there is a strong  presumption  that ex—ante rents  exist. 
Second, the industry  dummy variables  pass a specification test for 
orthogonality  with the error,  which suggests that industry is not 
correlated  with omitted quality variables.  And finally, evidence 
presented in Krueger (1988)  finds  that the fraction  of applicants  for 
federal  jobs who pass qualifying standards  increases  with the relative 
wage of federal  workers. 
This paper suggests several important  directions for future 
research to further examine the existence  of ex—ante rents in the labor 
market.  First,  the reasons why employers  seem to only partially extract 
rents created by the minimum wage need to be identified  and explored 
directly.  Second, data on the average quality of job seekers across 
industries  can be brought to bear on the issue of whether inter—industry 
job application  differentials represent  queues of qualified  workers. 
Finally, an examination  of the relationship  between appropriately 
measured vacancy duration and wage premia  would provide an alternative 
approach to measuring job queues. 30 
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